Executive Summary :

• The current dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia over the question of cultural copyright has led to instances of mob activism in the streets of Jakarta and other cities and the rising of tempers on both sides.

• However it should be noted that the sudden rise of pseudo-militia groups like the Benteng Demokrasi Rakyat (Bendera), Barisan Muda Betawi, Relawan Ganyang Malaysia and the Relawan Pembela Demokrasi (Repdem) is neither new nor unique to Indonesia, and would suggest both an internal domestic political campaign to discredit the government of President Yudhoyono and a return to the ‘Preman’- gangster mode of street politics of the 1970s and 80s.

• The militant potential of these groups and their capacity to take unilateral action against neighbouring countries and foreigners residing in Indonesia should not be exaggerated or over-estimated. Their activities thus far have been largely sensational, aimed at getting media attention and nothing more.

• There is no reason to believe that the current state of affairs can or will lead to direct conflict between the two countries, though the long-term implications of Indonesia’s culturally exclusive demands and claims will have a deeper impact on ASEAN as a whole as it would mean that Indonesia will make similar demands on other ASEAN countries as well, such as Singapore.

• In order to foreclose the possibility of further cultural conflicts in the future, it is imperative for ASEAN to formulate some sort of educational programme that aims to develop a common understanding of ASEAN’s shared cultural history and patrimony on the level of higher education as well as popular culture.

I. Background and Introduction :

Between August to September 2009 Indonesian-Malaysian relations plummeted to an alltime low with a number of Indonesian political parties, NGOs, lobby groups and selfproclaimed ‘patriotic militias’ calling on the Indonesian government to take stern action against Malaysia on the grounds that the latter had offended Indonesian national pride and sensitivities.

The catalyst that sparked the latest round of conflict was the airing of a Malaysian tourism promotional ad on the Discovery channel that featured a segment on the Pendet dance of Bali. This was seen and cast by the Indonesian media as another instance of Malaysia ‘stealing’ elements of Indonesian culture and claiming at as Malaysian.

Despite the facts behind the case – the ad was done by a non-Malaysian company that later apologised for the error and admitted that it was they, and not the Malaysian government responsible for the mistake – the prevailing mood in Indonesia was anti-Malaysian and the latest incident provided the pretext and justification for another round of anti-Malaysian demonstrations in the country.

Between August to early September demonstrations were held in Jakarta and several other cities in Java, leading to at least one reported incident of a protest in Jakarta in front of the Malaysian embassy where the Malaysian flag was burned. Local media reports also note that harassment of Malaysian students took place in Jakarta and Jogjakarta, where homes rented by Malaysian students were pelted with eggs and the walls defaced.

On 31 August, Malaysia’s Independence day, more than one hundred official Malaysian governmental websites were hacked by Indonesian hackers who defaced the sites and replaced them with pro-Indonesian slogans. By early September the anti-Malaysian mood was taken to the streets with vigilante groups unilaterally patrolling the streets of Jakarta in search of Malaysian citizens to ‘sweep’ from the country. (Jakarta Post, 8 Sept, Activists Conduct Sweep of Malaysians on the Streets). The same vigilante groups also threatened to take their violence to the more cosmopolitan parts of Jakarta and to target the area around the Malaysian embassy specifically. (Jakarta Post, 9 Sept, Anti-Malaysia Activists launch raid on Malaysians)

These developments were duly reported in Malaysia by both the pro-government and alternative media, and led to calls for the Malaysian government to protect the safety of Malaysian tourists and students in the neighbouring country. The reports also placed undue pressure on Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and his cabinet, forcing them to issue statements calling for calm and the restoration of order.

From July 2009 the Indonesian press was reporting about the on-going disputes between Malaysia and Indonesia and keeping the pressure on the government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. It should be noted that before and during the Presidential election campaign of 2009 – when SBY and the Partai Demokrat (PD) which he leads – was in the leading position in the polls, SBY was already being criticised for being ‘too soft’ in his handling of Indonesia’s foreign relations and standing in the ASEAN region.

• The internal domestic Indonesian context and the attacks on SBY and the PD between January to July 2009 :

While the tension between Indonesia and Malaysia was damaging to the international image of Indonesia, which had long been associated with instances of mass demonstrations, pogroms and attacks on minority groups as well as foreigners, it should be noted that much of the rhetoric and posturing in Indonesia is related to internal political pressures as well, that have been directed against the government of President Yudhoyono.

During the Parliamentary election campaign (DPR) in early March 2009, it was noted by local and foreign commentators that the campaign of most political parties was lacklustre and that it was an election without many issues. Notably, the Parliamentary elections witnessed the return to politics of several former high-ranking military leaders such as ex-Generals Prabowo and Wiranto, both of whom had managed to create new political parties (such as Prabowo’s Gerindra party) that demonstrated very clear nationalist leanings.

Prabowo and the Gerindra party’s campaign against President Yudhoyono and his PD party focused mainly on matters of national interest and appealed to the mass electorate of Indonesia on the basis of a renewed nationalism that sought to restore the national pride of the country, using popular symbols such as the Garuda and the Indonesian flag.

Even in the TV ads for the party, Gerindra was already signalling its intention to bring Indonesia back to a time when it was a united and formidable power in the region. Coupled with this was Parabowo/Gerindra’s appeal for economic nationalism that came in the form of calls for Indonesians to buy Indonesian products and not the goods and services of other neighbouring countries. Similar sentiments were found in the election campaign of other right-wing nationalist parties such as Hanura as well.

Apart from Hanura and Gerindra, Yudhoyono and the PD faced the challenge posed by Presidential candidate Megawati Sukarnoputri and the PDI-P, who also accused SBY of being too soft on matters of national interest. Before and during the election campaign (for both Parliament and the post of President), the PDI-P and its leaders accused SBY of not doing enough to defend the rights and interests of Indonesian workers working abroad, notably in Malaysia. The PDI-P raised issues that included the Ambalat dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia, and during her own campaign for the Presidency, Megawati accused Yudhoyono of giving in too much to Malaysia and not defending the integrity of Indonesia as a nation-state. At one point during the Presidential campaign SBY was forced to make concessionary moves such as temporarily halting the sending of Indonesian maids to Malaysia. It is against this backdrop of an increasingly issue-free yet highly competitive domestic political landscape that Yudhoyono is now forced to address the issue of Malaysia Indonesia relations ; and to maintain good working ties with Malaysia. However, there are many lingering issues that have to be resolved by both governments that are, at present, occupied with their own internal problems and are thus given less room to manoeuvre.

Among the issues that remain unresolved include :

• The Ambalat dispute over territory which led to several instances of anti-Malaysian demonstrations and which also gave rise to small groups of vigilantes and pseudo-militia units, including a militia unit that was recruiting members to go on a unilaterally-declared ‘invasion’ of Malaysia. While the Ambalat dispute continues, Indonesian news reports have noted that the Indonesian armed forces have been deployed close to Ambalat and that an airfield has been extended to serve the Indonesian air force there ;

• The on-going disputes about the conditions of Indonesian migrant workers as well as illegal immigrants in Malaysia, which has become an issue taken up by Indonesian labour rights NGOs and activists in the country. It should be noted however that thus far the Indonesian media has not highlighted the fact that the plight of Indonesian and other foreign workers in Malaysia has also been taken up by Malaysian labour rights NGOs such as Tenaganita, and that many Malaysian NGOs have been campaigning for years to improve the working conditions of foreign workers as well as the living conditions in the detention centres for illegal immigrants ;

• The much-publicised case of the Indonesian model Manohara Pinot, who was featured in the press after her separation from her Malaysian husband, who happens to a prince and a member of the Kelantan royal family in Malaysia. Manohara finally escaped from Malaysia via Singapore and upon her return was welcomed by several right-wing Indonesian nationalist groups who hailed her as a heroine. She has since joined one of these groups and now claims to work as an activist in support of Indonesian workers in Malaysia ;

• The long-held grievances against Malaysia for allegedly ‘stealing’ Indonesian culture and cultural practices such as dances, art forms and music. Until today Indonesia claims that the Malaysian national anthem ‘Negaraku’ was ‘stolen’ and based on an Indonesian song ‘Terang Bulan’. However it has been noted by historians that the Indonesian song ‘Terang Bulan’ was quite likely a French sailors’ ditty that was made popular by European sailors who travelled across the Pacific Ocean long before it came to be known as an Indonesian song ;

• The case of the Malaysian terrorist-fugitive Nordin Mohd Top, who was living in hiding in Indonesia and who was alleged to be a member of the Jamaah Islamiyah underground terrorist network. It should be noted that the case of Nordin Top is one that has never been taken up by SBY or any other prominent Indonesian politician against Malaysia, owing to the fact that Malaysia was likewise burdened by the presence of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir who was once a fugitive Malaysia too. However the Nordin Top issue has been exploited by the tabloid press and has become the material for anti-Malaysia jibes and jokes on popular TV shows, comedies and talk shows like ‘Empat Mata’ and the like. Nording Top features regularly alongside other anti-Malaysian jokes such as ‘Don’t tell the Malaysians we had an earthquake, otherwise they will claim it too.’ Etc.

The list of complaints on the part of Indonesians against Malaysians is long, and has been exploited by the opponents of SBY and the PD in an attempt to create the impression that the government of President Yudhoyono is weak and ineffective. However it is important to identify who are the real actors and agents behind the rise of the newly-minted selfappointed militias and vigilante groups such as the Benteng Demokrasi Rakyat (Bendera), Barisan Muda Betawi, Relawan Ganyang Malaysia and the Relawan Pembela Demokrasi (Repdem) that are currently on the prowl in Jakarta and other cities, looking for Malaysians to ‘sweep’ out of their country.

The sudden emergence of these groups has given analysts cause to suspect that Indonesia still retains features of its culture of Preman gangsters and clandestine militias that dates back to the Suharto era. During the period of Nasution, pseudo-militia units like Ratih (Rakyat Terlatih) and Pamswaraksa were likewise trained, funded and instrumentally deployed by senior army officers like generals Moerdani and Wiranto, who used such groups in order to harass and eliminate opponents both in and out of the country.

However it ought to be noted that groups such as the Benteng Demokrasi Rakyat (Bendera), Barisan Muda Betawi, Relawan Ganyang Malaysia and the Relawan Pembela Demokrasi (Repdem) have only gained prominence due to the media’s attention directed towards them, and the fact that their activities have been highlighted – unduly some would argue – by TV channels like Metro TV. Outside of Jakarta their influence is next to negligible and it should be noted that similar groups have not been set up in other cities with large urban populations and high concentrations of youth such as Bandung, Jogjakarta, Surakarta or Surabaya. As such, it is important to consider the media impact these groups have had, which is disproportionate to their actual activities and capacity to cause trouble between the two countries.

Linked to this is the question of who is funding and supporting these groups and why :

Apart from TV channels like Metro TV, little is known about the groups themselves at this stage apart from their spokesmen, leaders and overall membership – which comes mostly from unemployed youth linked to Preman gangs. One well known ‘celebrity’ who has been elevated to the status of the spokeswoman of the Laskar Merah-Putih is the former model Manohara Pinot (former wife to the Prince of Kelantan mentioned above), who has been a ‘celebrity nationalist’ but with no political clout whatsoever. Indonesian activists and academics interviewed in Jogajakarta and Surakarta (between 19 and 21 September) noted that Manohara herself is seen largely as a young woman who has been manipulated by these groups and whose own career as a model and actress has been faltering of late.

Most of our respondents, however, noted that while no clear hand has been identified behind these groups, it is well known that President Yudhoyono is under pressure from other Indonesian politicians who are bent on weakening his standing and to discredit his nationalist credentials. President Yudhoyono has also openly attacked some of his opponents including Megawati Sukarnoputri for causing unrest and has even publicly hinted that former general and now leader of the Gerindra party Prabowo had a hand in the recent Marriot hotel bombing in Jakarta. Within 24 hours of the attacks in Jakarta President Yudhoyono, during a press conference, openly alluded to Prabowo as having an interest in creating the impression that he was a weak president and causing strife in the country.

It should be remembered that the re-election of President Yudhoyono and the victory of his Partai Demokrat was widely taken to be illustrative of the maturity of the Indonesian electorate and the development of perhaps the biggest real democracy in Southeast Asia. Yet as soon as the results were announced, dissenting voices could be heard from Yudhoyono’s competitors and other political parties such as the PDI-P under the leadership of Megawati Sukarnoputri. Since then, the heated discussions about the election results and procedures have continued unabated. But anti-Malaysian campaigns are not new in Indonesia and Indonesian politicians like Agung Laksono are well known for their long-held anti-Malaysian sentiments by now.

It is widely known in Indonesia that Yudhoyono’s and PD’s victory had been contested from the start. Furthermore there are those who wish to use every opportunity to weaken the president’s standing and to discredit him both domestically and internationally. Who are the ones who have been at the forefront of this campaign to demonise Malaysia and discredit Yudhoyono and the PD at the same time ? The role of the Indonesian media is crucial here : Responsible newspapers and magazines such as the Jakarta Post, Tempo and Republika have been giving objective coverage of the issue, and different voices have been heard in their editorials, giving a balanced coverage of the Malaysia-Indonesia spat.

However one private TV channel – Metro TV – has been at the front of the campaign to highlight the issue, and it was Metro TV ‘that first blew up the story of the Pendet dance ad used by the Malaysian tourist agency’, according to veteran journalist Yoebal Rasyid. ‘For me, this is an instance where the TV station was using the issue to give the impression that SBY (Yudhoyono) is weak’. It should be noted that the man behind Metro TV is Surya Paloh, a prominent member of the Golkar Party and who had once put himself forward for the post of President of Indonesia. Paloh is also known as one of the more vocal critics of Yudhoyono, and his hugely popular Metro TV remains his most powerful asset in the political landscape of Indonesia today.

The tabloid press in Indonesia has also played a visible role in developing the momentum of the anti-Malaysian campaign, and it was the tabloid press that has been highlighting the many cases of abuses of Indonesian nationals and workers. TV channels continue to feature programmes and soap operas that depict Malaysians as being rude and unfriendly to Indonesians as well.

It is also interesting to note that the anti-Malaysian demonstrations have taken on the historically loaded semiotics of the Konfrontasi between Indonesia and Malaysia in the early 1960s. ‘There are Sukarnoist elements behind the rhetoric’, notes Prof Bambang Setiaji, rector of Muhamadiyah University Surakarta (UMS), who also notes that the dominant theme of the vigilante groups is the ‘defence of a united Indonesia’, harking back to the nationalist rhetoric of the Sukarno era.

So what seems to be happening at the moment is the conjunction of a range of unconnected but related agendas on the part of a myriad of actors and agents : ‘Islamic Youth groups that were formerly close to Golkar have also joined in the anti-Malaysian campaign ; the PDI-P of Megawati is cashing in on the issue to rekindle the faded nostalgia of Sukarno, Megawati’s father ; and local preman gangsters and thugs are jumping on the bandwagon just to make some quick money too’, noted another prominent Indonesian journalist.

• Malaysia’s response to Indonesia’s claims

Thus far (mid-September 2009) the Malaysian government’s reaction to the dispute with Indonesia has been a mixture of bewilderment and inaction. Malaysian politicians, including the Prime Minister Najib Razak, have issued only mild statements of caution for Malaysian tourists and students currently living and travelling to Indonesia. On 17 September the foreign ministers of both countries met in Jakarta in an attempt to calm the tempers on both sides. There have been no acts of reprisal against Indonesians in Malaysia, no burning of the Indonesian flag and no groups that have systematically targeted Indonesian nationals in the country.

However it should also be noted that the relatively passive reaction of the Malaysian authorities to the complaints of the Indonesians is one of the factors that has contributed to the crisis, for it reinforces the impression that the Malaysians are heedless of the worries and concerns of Indonesians.

The most glaring instance of this passive indifference of late involves the case of the Indonesian model Manohara Pinot, who was married to a member of the Kelantan royal family. Following the breakdown of their marriage, Manohara alleged that she was physically and psychologically abused by her Malaysian spouse, and had tried to end the marriage and return to Indonesia. Manohara was, however, prevented from doing so, leading to her family alleging that she had been kidnapped by members of the royal family. In the end, Manohara managed to return to Indonesia via Singapore, and upon her return was welcomed by anti-Malaysian nationalists. In the wake of the Manohara issue, her story was played up by the tabloid media and later serialised into a soap opera entitled Tangisan Isabella (The Tears of Isabella), which features an Indonesian model who is kidnapped and abused by a foreign royal family who speak with a clearly Malaysian accent.

The Malaysian government’s reluctance to intervene in the case of Manohara when she was resident in Malaysia added to the impression that the Malaysian government was heedless of the safety and welfare of Indonesians. Manohara’s mother has also claimed that she was denied access to her daughter and not allowed into the country ; a claim that was likewise played up by the anti-Malaysian nationalist groups there. The Malaysian government, on the other hand, explained its own reluctance to intervene in her case on the grounds that the federal government does not have the right to interfere in the private domain of citizens and their married lives. This explanation did not go down well in Indonesia.

Moreover, it should also be noted that the Malaysian embassy in Indonesia has not been proactive enough in its soft diplomacy and has done little to explain the Malaysian side of the story to the Indonesian public, notably the press. There have been no reports of Malaysian embassy staff proactively engaging with Indonesian students, activists or cultural groups to seek support and understanding of the issues concerned. (This is in contrast to the proactive role played by the American embassy in Indonesia between 2002 to 2007, which worked hard to improve the image of the United States, notably in the campuses of the country. One initiative was the ‘American corner’ programme, where American officials would actively seek out willing Indonesian universities to host an ‘American corner’ on campus where books, videos and other forms of American popular culture and information were distributed to students on campus, with the aim of showing to Indonesians what life was like in the United States, notably for American Muslims.)

Regardless of the media hype, however, it should be pointed out that despite the overheated rhetoric of the Indonesian vigilante groups not a single Malaysian citizen has been harassed or attacked. Likewise, as was the case during the Ambalat dispute, not a single Indonesian vigilante group or pseudo-militia unit has ever actually made an attempt to enter Malaysian territory to conduct raids or attacks.

It should also be noted that Malaysian students in Indonesia have not been called to return to the country, and that despite the lingering tension between the two countries that has been widely reported in the press since the beginning of the year, Malaysian tourists continue to travel to Indonesia even during off-peak seasons and when Indonesia was put on the ‘danger’ list by international travel agencies. The Jakarta Post (9 Sept 2009) noted that : ‘Jakarta’s chapter of the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) showed that Malaysians topped the list of tourists visiting the capital in July, the month when the twin bombings rocked the JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotels in South Jakarta.’

It would therefore be premature at this stage to assume that the tension between Malaysia and Indonesia can or will escalate into anything more than a continuous spat over cultural rights and intellectual property rights ; despite the calls on the part of right-wing Indonesian nationalist groups to ‘crush Malaysia’. Though anti-Malaysian sentiments might be fanned by Indonesian politicians, pseudo-militia groups such as the Benteng Demokrasi Rakyat, Relawan Ganyang Malaysia, Barisan Muda Betawi and the Relawan Pembela Demokrasi and TV channels such as Metro TV, the appeal of these groups on a mass level is small, and their numbers insignificant when compared to the size of Indonesia’s population of more than 240 million people.

Furthermore it ought to be noted that despite the calls to ‘crush Malaysia’ by right-wing nationalist groups in Indonesia, Malaysians remain consumers of Indonesian popular culture and Indonesian pop music, videos, soap operas and films remain popular in the country. One factor that has not been highlighted enough by the Malaysian government (as well as the Indonesian government) is the long-standing historical connection between the two countries, and the fact that thousands of Malaysian citizens today happen to be Malaysian citizens of Indonesian ancestry, who had themselves migrated Malaysia decades ago. This accounts for the close familial bonds between many Malaysians and Indonesians, despite the occasional conflicts that might arise between the governments of both countries. It should however also be noted that the goodwill between ordinary Malaysians and Indonesians that has been maintained thus far has more to do with long standing familial bonds rather than the diplomatic efforts of the Malaysian embassy ; whose presence in Indonesia is barely felt outside the confines of Jakarta.

II. The implications of growing Indonesian Assertiveness on ASEAN as a whole

Indonesia’s growing assertiveness in Southeast Asia is seen and felt particularly by those who work on and in the diplomatic-academic enclave of Indonesian and regional studies.

It has been observed of late that this growing assertiveness has expressed itself not only among right-wing pseudo-militia units and ethno-nationalist lobby groups, but also among the country’s intellectual and political elite. The Indonesian media today regularly features columns and op-eds that bemoan the fact that Indonesia is not taken more seriously by the other countries in the region. Furthermore some of the more strident nationalist voices and opinion-makers in Indonesia have publicly opined that Indonesia needs ASEAN less than ASEAN needs Indonesia.

The return of such nationalist rhetoric to Indonesia’s diplomatic, academic and political spheres is not entirely surprising for it has been observed by many Indonesian scholars that nationalism and the notion of a united Indonesian archipelago has been a prominent feature of Indonesian political discourse since the 1950s. Understanding the roots of this nationalist rhetoric requires some understanding of Indonesia’s postcolonial past, and how the country was forced to rally itself together in the face of several regional revolts in the 1950s that threatened the integrity of the state.

These unitary tendencies that often point to a mode of centralised politics were further propagated and enhanced during the period of Sukarno’s rule, when the weak Indonesian state was being torn apart by internal clashes along both ideological and regional faultlines :

The PEMESTA/PRRI revolt in the outer island provinces contributed to the sense of urgency and the need to enhance the centralised state apparatus that was held together by constitutional law as well as the threat of legitimate state violence and force.

Historically it should also be noted that Indonesia’s centrist tendencies have been nurtured by the fear of internal revolt, fragmentation and the constant worry about internal enemies ; notably the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) – that was cast as the ‘puppet of Beijing’ in the 1960s and virtually wiped out during the anti-Communist putsch of 1965-67 that witnessed the fall of Sukarno and the rise of General Suharto and the military regime.

Much of the anti-Malaysian as well as pro-Indonesian rhetoric we see and hear today stems from these historical roots, and the feeling of trauma, loss and threat that have been cultivated since the Sukarno years. The semantic and symbolic continuities are evident in the anti-Malaysian rhetoric we see today :

• The use of the phrase ‘ganjang Malaysia’ (Crush Malaysia) by both right-wing anti-Malaysian nationalist pseudo-militias and vigilantes today is reminiscent of the same rhetoric employed by Sukarno and Subandrio during the Konfrontasi campaign of the early to mid 1960s, and was propagated mainly by the PKI then, prior to its eradication at the hands of right-wing pro-military elements. Today, it has been noted that the same rhetoric that couples the theme of ‘crushing Malaysia’ with the theme of defending Indonesian pride and national integrity is being propounded by Sukarnoist elements in Indonesia, notably right-wing nationalist groups linked to and supported by the PDI-P of Megawati Sukarnoputri as well as right-wing nationalist parties like Hanura and Gerindra.

While the present anti-Malaysian campaign has not resorted to the rhetoric of armed military conflict, its ideological connotations are clear to Indonesian intellectuals who see this as a re-assertion of the Sukarnoist ideology of the 1950s and 1960s.

• Linked to this rhetoric of exclusive nationalism are the concerns that were popular during the time of Sukarno as well. The claim that the Malaysian national anthem was stolen from the Indonesians for instance, was a common claim that was made by Sukarno in the late 1950s as well, during the prelude to the ganjang Malaysia campaign that was instigated by the PKI.

• Another theme that dates back to the Sukarno period is the call for Indonesia to assume its rightful and appointed place as the leading player in regional affairs ; which happens to be a theme that was popular during Sukarno’s period of rule as well. Indonesian nationalists who today see Indonesia as needing ASEAN less than ASEAN needs Indonesia are demonstrating tendencies that were already evident in the 1950s and 1960s.

While much of this can be dismissed as rhetoric that is meant for internal consumption, Indonesia’s demands to be placed at the centre of ASEAN politics cannot. Equally difficult to avoid would be the Indonesian claim to ownership of many aspects of regional cultures as well. At present Indonesia is negotiating with UNESCO to have its batik patterns and designs patented, so as to be able to make the claim that batik is a unique and exclusive Indonesian cultural product. This claim is linked to the other claim that Indonesian culture and cultural products have been ‘stolen’ by neighbouring countries that also claim that batik is Malaysian and Singaporean.

Indonesian cultural activists have claimed that Indonesian batik and the batik industry is now facing pressure on two fronts :

On the one hand Indonesia is forced to deal with the import of mass-produced imitation batik that is made in China on printing presses that are now flooding the country, thereby threatening the livelihood of local batik producers. (It should be noted that the perceived threat to the local batik industry was in fact the main factor that led to the emergence of the Sarekat Islam Indonesia, one of the first nationalist organisations of Indonesia, and which also helped to create the anti-Dutch anti-colonial movement in the early 1900s.)

On the other hand Indonesian batik producers have claimed that Malaysian and Singaporean batik dealers have been selling Indonesian batik as Malaysian and Singaporean products, which they claim to be an instance of copyright and patent infringement.

Indonesia’s claims on batik as an exclusive Indonesian product is therefore the tip of the iceberg and the prelude to what can be described as the ‘cultural war’ between Indonesia and Malaysia, and by extension much of the rest of the region. Due to the fact that the legal and institutional mechanisms that ASEAN (as presently constituted) currently possesses to deal with such instances of cultural borrowing and sharing remain relatively weak, such disputes are set to linger for some time and will provide grist to the mill of right-wing Indonesian nationalist groups who continue to present the picture of an Indonesian nation that has been humbled and robbed by her neighbours. Dealing with the thorny issue of cultural overlap and cross-cultural fertilization will require some imaginative thinking on the part of the policy-makers in ASEAN, but it will also require an objective approach to the question of cultural production, and patenting as well.

III. The ‘Cultural Conflict’ between Indonesia and Malaysia, and the rest of ASEAN : Concluding Observations

One factor that has accounted for the current misunderstanding and breakdown of communication between Malaysia and Indonesia is the historical blindness of both countries to the ties that bind them.

Many Indonesians do not realise that in many parts of Malaysia today the Javanese language is still spoken, particularly among Malaysians of Javanese descent who wish to maintain their linguistic and cultural links to the land of their ancestors. And how many Indonesians realise that there are literally millions of Malaysians who are of Javanese, Bugis, Madurese, Balinese and Sumatran descent in Malaysia today ? The same historical blindness is evident in Malaysia as well, where so many Malaysians fail to see and accept the simple fact that Malaysia ’s history is invariably tied up with the history of Indonesia – and other neighbouring countries like Thailand and Singapore – too.

It is against this backdrop of mutual ignorance and lack of historical perspective that we are witnessing what can be labelled the ‘cultural conflict’ in the region at present. Over the past few months, diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Malaysia have plummeted as Indonesians blame Malaysia and other ASEAN countries of ‘stealing’ ideas and products that they deem are Indonesian in origin.

It is this lack of a common historical knowledge that accounts for the claims of ‘cultural stealing’ on the part of Indonesian activists and politicians. For instance : the wayang kulit (shadow puppet theatre) genre is not unique to Java but has always existed in Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, Southern Thailand and even further afield all the way to South China, India and Turkey. It is therefore impossible for any country to lay exclusive claim to wayang kulit as being essentially theirs. And is it not also true that the epic tales that make up the narratives of the region’s wayang culture are derived from the Ramayana and Mahabharata of India ? If that be the case, how would Southeast Asians react if Indians were to tell them that they have ‘stolen’ their culture ?

The same observation can be made about the languages that are indigenous to Southeast Asia, almost all of which are etymologically derived from Sanskrit and other Indian languages and dialects. Is it not the case that almost half of the words in Bahasa Indonesia, Bahasa Melayu, Thai, Khmer, Lao and Burmese are also derivative Sanskrit ? On that basis it would be impossible for any linguistic community to claim monopoly over a particular word or symbol, and likewise impossible for any community to insist that it has patent or copyright on any particular work of literature : For the fact is that almost all the great works of Southeast Asian literature were composed via a process of cultural sharing, overlap and cross-fertilisation over the centuries.

Resolving the current dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia will require some degree of intelligence and less emotionalism and anger. For a start, the politicians of the region will have to do their part to promote a common history of Southeast Asia that reminds all of us of our shared cross-cultural origins and the long history of cultural overlap and borrowing that took place up to the colonial era, and in so doing add substance to ASEAN’s aspirations to create a social-cultural community. Academics, and in particular historians, also have a role to play to remind their students and society at large of the long-standing historical continuities that continue to bind Southeast Asians together. Till today there is hardly any common history textbook for all of Southeast Asia, which draws these historical links and connections together. This would be a topic that ought to interest the foreign ministers of both countries, in their effort to find a solution to the current impasse between Malaysia and Indonesia.

It is also important to note that the claims that are being made by Indonesia are in some respects also post-historical in nature :

Every state in Southeast Asia today is a modern construct whose borders were set during the colonial era ; and yet each ASEAN country traces its history and makes its historical claims on the basis of a pre-colonial past that predates the emergence of modern nationstates with fixed territorial boundaries and fixed political identities. It should be remembered that even the name ‘Indonesia’ (like ‘Malaysia’) is a colonial construct that was invented and introduced in the 19th century.

Yet there is enough historical evidence to show that much of the common shared cultural heritage of Southeast Asia dates back to the pre-modern Hindu-Buddhist era which shaped and defined the cultures and identities of the peoples in the region ; and that it would be wrong to suggest that Indonesian claims on batik, wayang kulit or even language today can be sustained against the backdrop of a common shared regional history where the movement of peoples, ideas and cultures was once far more fluid than it is today.

The outcomes of this observation are two fold :

Firstly for ASEAN, it entails the need to develop a sense of common regional identity that predates the modern era while working within the framework of exclusive and clearly-defined nation-states. This has yet to be done for the reasons stated above, notably the lack of a common historical curriculum for all ASEAN citizens ; thus leaving Southeast Asians blind and ignorant of each others’ histories.

Secondly, it means that ASEAN will have to agree and accept the fact that the region shares not only a common past but also a commonly shared cultural patrimony where all communities have contributed and draw from. For any country in ASEAN to make culturally specific and exclusive demands and to deny other communities the right to enjoy, use, reproduce and commodify aspects of a common ASEAN history and culture on the grounds that it belongs exclusively to one community would be making the mistake of cultural essentialism in the political domain. Its implication will be the loss of cultural interchange and dynamism that once animated the region, opening the way for culturally-shaped conflicts such as what we are seeing between Indonesia and Malaysia today.

Thirdly, it ought to be noted that in such instances, tit-for-tat reprisals would not help calm the nerves on both sides or improve the situation. The recent announcement by Malaysian politicians that Malaysian products like Nasi Lemak, Laksa Johor and Ipoh Kway Teow may also be ‘patented’ is therefore a move in the wrong direction, as it would suggest that nothing has been learned from the current impasse between the two countries. At present the popular Malay hero Hang Tuah is a prominent figure in Indonesia as well, with streets named after him in Jakarta, Bandung and Surabaya. For Malaysia to demand that Indonesian re-name their streets or to claim that Hang Tuah is an exclusive cultural product of Malaysia would only aggravate the situation further, and escalate the cultural conflict we are witnessing in the region today.

by Farish A. Noor, Senior Fellow, RSIS, Contemporary Islam Program

for Malaysia Update September 2009

published by S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), a Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University